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Improving Georgia's Probate
Code: Sales by the Personal

Representative and Enforcement
of Installment Land Contracts
By Verner F. Chaffin*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Under Georgia law when one dies intestate, the title to the decedent's
real property immediately descends to his heirs at law and the title to the
personalty vests in the administrator of the estate for the benefit of the
creditors and heirs.1 Title to all property passing by will, both realty and
personalty, passes to the executor until he assents to the devise or legacy.,
During the course of the administration of an estate, it often becomes
necessary to sell some of the assets of the estate to satisfy debts, taxes,
administration expenses and general pecuniary legacies. Georgia law provides the machinery under which these sales may be made and gives the
administrator the power to divest the heirs at law of whatever title they
3
may have in the property.
* Fuller E. Callaway Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., LL.B.,
University of Georgia, 1939, 1942; J.S.D., Yale University, 1961. The author gratefully acknowledges the research and editorial help of Mr. Richard H. Lee, J.D,, University of Georgia, 1980, Associate, King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia.
1. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-901 (1975); Epps v. Epps, 141 Ga. App. 659, 234 S.E.2d 140
(1977). The administrator has the right to possession of the entire estate, reality as well as
personalty, and is the proper person to recover possession from third parties. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 113-907 (1975). If there is no personal representative, the heirs themselves may sue in
their own name. The title of the heirs to intestate land is subject to divestiture by the
administrator for paying debts or for making distribution. V. CHAFFIN, STUDIES IN THE GEORGIA LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS 79 (1978).
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-801 (1975).
3. "To divest the title of the heir at law, the administrator shall have authority to sell; if
there shall be irregularities, or if he shall fail to comply with the law as to the mode of sale,
the sale shall be voidable, except as to innocent purchasers." GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1720
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Several concerns are at stake in the evaluation of any statutory scheme
dealing with sales and conveyances by the personal representative. Adequate protection to the heirs, creditors and others who may have an interest in the estate property must be provided against any possible misuse of
the property by the personal representative; the personal representative
must be given sufficient power and latitude so that he is not constrained
from acting in the best interest of the heirs and creditors; the costs of
administration must be minimized; and the probate courts should not be
burdened with unnecessary work.
This article will analyze the legislative machinery in Georgia governing
sales by the personal representative. Attention will also be devoted to the
enforcement of installment land contracts following the decedent vendor's death. It will be seen that, unless the will includes a power of sale,
the personal representative generally cannot sell realty or personalty
without probate court approval. The thesis will be developed that this
constraint is wholly outmoded and that the burden of its time consuming
and costly process far outweighs any protection it might afford.
Georgia law recognizes the installment land contract (bond for title) as
a means for the long-term financing of the purchase of land.4 This arrangement binds the seller in a penal sum to make good title to the purchaser. It will be seen that the bond for title is virtually obsolete in Georgia, and that the statutory treatment of a bond for title as an entity
separate from the contract to sell land serves no purpose.
II.
A.

SALES OF PROPERTY

In General

At common law the personal representative had the power without
court order to pledge, sell, or dispose of the decedent's personal assets
and pass good title to the purchaser.5 In the absence of a will containing a
(1975).
4. "The old-fashioned 'bond for title' or 'contract for deed' was usually a rather brief
instrument. The modern 'installment land contract' is generally a much longer and more
detailed instrument .
0..."
0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JULIN & A. SMITH, CASES ON
BASIC PROPERTY LAW 1031 (3d ed. 1979). A bond for title is "an agreement to make title in
the future, an executory or incomplete sale, which is sometimes called a 'bond for a deed.'"
Ingram v. Smith, 62 Ga. App. 335, 342, 7 S.E.2d 922, 926 (1940); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
162 (5th ed. 1979). "An agreement to buy and sell real estate on small monthly payments."
"It is not a conveyance of legal title but merely a contract to convey and may ripen into an
equitable title upon payment of the consideration." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 162.
5. "At common law the personal representative is deemed to be the owner of the property to the extent of being able to sell the chattel interests and pass title to the purchaser."
T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 664 (2d ed. 1953); J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD, R.
EFFLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1212 (5th ed. 1977).
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power of sale, the decedent's real property could not be sold except by
order of the court. Unless changed by statute the common law rule
prevails and no court order is necessary for sales of personalty. Legislation in many states requires court authority for all or certain kinds of
sales.7 Some of these statutes are designed merely for the protection of
the personal representative, and where this is the philosophy, a sale by
him, even without court order, passes good title to the purchaser. In such,
the representative is under no liability unless fraud or imprudence can be
shown. In other jurisdictions the absence of court approval invalidates the
sale.
Unless the will confers a power to sell, it is necessary to rely upon statutory authority for the sale of land. Virtually every state has legislation
providing that land may be sold by court order in order to pay debts.s
These statutes generally are quite detailed in providing for judicial supervision over the sale and in affording safeguards against abuse.
B.

Judicial Supervision Over Sales in Georgia

The personal representative must obtain a court order to perform virtually any sale that is not specifically authorized by the decedent's will.'
The ostensible purpose in requiring judicial approval is to protect the interests of the heirs and creditors by allowing them to be heard by the
probate court before a sale is ordered.' 0
Any sale by an administrator without a valid court order will not pass
any right or title to the purchaser." However, whether or not an order by
the probate court is valid and therefore vests the administrator with authority to sell is not always a simple question. For example, even if an
order of sale is obtained from the probate court, no title passes if the
administrator sells the property outside the county without the special
order referred to in section 113-1707.'2 Further, a sale under a court order
6. This was based on the rationale that title to realty passed directly to the heirs or
devisees without the intervention of the personal representative. ATKINSON, WILLS, supra
note 5, at 688.
7. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 1122 (2d ed. 1978).
8. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 14.7 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
9. In Guthrie v. Moran, 192 Ga. 607, 15 S.E.2d 890 (1941), the court stated that the
words "authority to sell" appearing in GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1720 (1975) refer to the order of
the ordinary granting leave to sell. See also Adamson v. Petty, 230 Ga. 87, 195 S.E.2d 436
(1973); Wilcox v. Thomas, 191 Ga. 319, 12 S.E.2d 343 (1940).
10. This purpose was reflected in the early case of Fussell v. Dennard, 118 Ga. 270, 45
S.E. 247 (1903), where the court held that a sale consummated without the requisite notice
to the creditors of an estate is a nullity.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1707 (1975); Hawks v. Smith, 141 Ga. 422, 81 S.E. 200 (1913).
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cannot ratify or validate a prior illegal transfer.'" If a sale is made upon a
court order but there has been no notice or advertisement as required by
statute, no title passes. 4 If the court order requires a public sale but the
administrator makes a private sale, the purchaser receives no title. 5
The administrator must also comply with the other statutory procedures before he has authority to convey good title. An heir or creditor
may void an irregular sale except where an innocent purchaser for value
is involved." If a sale contains an irregularity of which the purchaser has
knowledge, it is voidable at the election of an heir or creditor. 7 However,
if the purchaser has no knowledge of the irregularity, the sale cannot be
attacked.s Moreover, a "mere irregularity" does not prevent title from
i
passing.
This has the effect of putting a purchaser who has inquired into the
procedures and terms of a sale, thereby discovering an irregularity, in a
worse position than the purchaser who has made no inquiry nor has notice of the irregularity. This result discourages purchasers from inquiring
too closely and diminishes any protection given to the heirs and creditors
by the statutory provision. Furthermore, it appears that an heir could
void a sale even if the irregularity did not cause him any injury. In such a
case there is no just reason for allowing him to void the sale. The provision also raises a question as to the marketability of the purchaser's title
because of the possibility that it may be voided. The uncertainty of
course decreases the value of the property, thereby harming the interests
of the heirs or devisees.
III.
A.

SALE OF PERSONALTY

Categories of Personalty
Georgia has several statutes dealing with the sale of various types of

13. In Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Mason, 140 Ga. 141, 78 S.E. 935 (1913), the agent for the
defendant insurance company fraudulently obtained from a widow-beneficiary an assignment of the installments due her on the policy covering her husband. Although the "sale"
was subsequently approved in an order from the ordinary, the court declared such an order
to be a nullity in light of the prior fraud.
14. Fussell v. Dennard, 118 Ga. 270, 45 S.E. 247 (1903).
15. Such was the case in Sapp v. Cline, 131 Ga. 433, 62 S.E. 529 (1908).
16.

GA. CODE ANN.

§

113-1720 (1975).

17. Id. Although this statute does not state who may void the sale, case law limits the
power to do so to heirs and creditors. Fraser v. Rummele, 195 Ga. 839, 25 S.E.2d 662 (1943).
18. The Georgia courts seem to have become a bit more lenient about slight departures
from exact compliance with the statutory requirements. For example, in Adamson v. Petty,
230 Ga. 87, 195 S.E.2d 436 (1973), the actual terms of the administrator's sale were slightly
different from those advertised. The court ruled that the discrepancy was insufficient to
void the sale.

1980]

IMPROVING GEORGIA'S PROBATE CODE

319

personalty, e.g., perishable property,1 ' insolvent or doubtful notes,20
stocks, bonds and notes, 21 and livestock." There is no statutory reference
to any other types of personal property or even to personalty in general.
The personal representative is required to sell perishable property at
"as early a date as practicable," and specifications are established for
3
seeking an order of sale and giving notice.'
Corporate stock which is part of the decedent's estate may be sold by
an administrator provided he follows the procedures required in the sale
of real estate.2" An exception to this rule is that any stocks or bonds
which are listed on an exchange or which are regularly quoted in a newspaper having general circulation in Georgia may be sold at a private sale
so long as the sale price is not less than the published bid price.' 5 Under
this exception the administrator is still required to obtain a court order
and file a return.2
A note or other evidence of indebtedness may be sold without a court
order and at a private sale but only if the administrator can sell for the
face value of the note.' 7 Otherwise, a court order and public sale are required.' 8 Provision is made for the discretionary sale of uncollectible evidences of debts, and the procedures leading up to the sale itself are set

forth."
An administrator, upon obtaining a court order, may sell livestock at a
public auction in whatever manner he deems most advantageous to the
estate. He is still, of course, accountable in all respects for any lack of

§ 113-1701 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1705 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-1724, -1732, -1733 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1734 (1975).

19.
20.
21.
22.

GA. CODE ANN.

23.

At least ten days' notice must be given before perishable property may be ordered

sold. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1701 (1975). All personalty is regarded as perishable except evidences of indebtedness and shares of corporate stock. 2 REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 307 (4th ed. 1979). All crops, matured or unmatured, are personalty. GA.
CODE ANN. § 85-1901 (1978).
24. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1724 (1975).
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1732 (1975).
26. A waiting period of ten days is required between the application for permission to
sell and the order allowing the sale. Once the sale is completed, the personal representative
must file a return showing the date of the sale, name of purchaser, the bid price of the stock
at time of sale and the proceeds realized therefrom. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1732 (1975).
27. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1733 (1975).
28. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1724 (1975) provides that the sale of unlisted corporate stock
shall be conducted in the same manner as the sale of land, i.e., upon petition and notice
published once a week for four weeks before the hearing and order to sell is granted, as
provided in GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1707 (1975).
29. The sale is at public outcry, preceded by thirty days' notice given at the courthouse
door and at least three other public places in the county. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1705 (1975).
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good faith.3 0
Except for the sale of livestock, each of the statutes contains its own
provisions concerning the petition for court order, the sale, and the requisite notice. Thus, a personal representative wishing to sell personal property consisting of an inventory of food, a note given the decedent, ten
shares of corporate stock, a herd of cattle, and an automobile has the
burdensome task of following the separate provisions of section 113-1701
for the food, section 113-1705 for the insolvent note, sections 113-1724, 1732, and -1733 for the corporate stock, and section 113-1734 for the cattle. However, the personal representative has no section to which he may
refer to for directions concerning the sale of the automobile.
B. Miscellaneous Provisions
Property Held Adversely to the Estate. The sale of property
which is held adversely to the estate by a third person is prohibited. 1
While the cases construing this section have involved adverse possession
of land, the language of the statute does not limit its application to realty.
The evident purpose is to protect the estate from potential litigation as
well as from the lower price that adversely held property would fetch in
the marketplace. But the question must be asked: Is this section really
necessary, or could the object of the statute be more efficiently attained
by means of vesting the personal representative with a general fiduciary
duty to act in the best interests of the estate?
Public or Private Sale. The Code makes no specific distinction between public and private sales of personalty. Section 113-1716, however,
provides that certain private sales of land are contrary to public policy, s
and section 113-1717 declares that private sales of decedents' property
are to be allowed only when specifically authorized by the will. 3
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1734 (1975).
31. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1714 (1975) provides: "An administrator may not sell property
held adversely to the estate by a third person; he shall first recover possession."
32. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1716 (1975) states: "A private sale of land by an administrator
under an obligation or agreement to perfect the same by a compliance with legal formalities,
is contrary to public policy, and such sales shall always be open to review at the option of
parties at interest."
33. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1717 (1975). The Georgia courts have strictly construed testamentary provisions authorizing the sale of land or personalty. If the will does not provide
for a private sale, the sale must be at public outcry. In Bonner v. Bell, 206 Ga. 98, 55 S.E.2d
612 (1949), the supreme court held the following language in a will to be insufficient to
authorize an executrix to sell realty or personalty at private sale: "I desire that such executrix have full power to handle and dispose of my estate without making any bond, and that
such executrix be in no manner restricted in the handling of my said estate." Id. at 102, 55
S.E.2d at 615.
30.
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Although section 113-17161" is literally applicable only to private sales
of land, it might well deter an administrator from consummating a private sale of personalty. And section 113-1717, by negative implication,
looks askance on any private sale not specifically authorized by a testator.
Yet without repealing these sections, the legislature in 1974 passed section 113-1702(b) s ' which authorizes the private sale of personalty (and
realty) to pay debts of the decedent or to effect distribution.36 Even if
this 1974 amendment could be said to clarify the confusion surrounding
the validity of private sales of personalty cast by section 113-1716 and
section 113-1717, it imposes additional technicalities with which the personal representative must comply in order to consummate the sale. In
addition to requiring the usual petition to the court for leave to sell, section 113-1702(b) generally directs that "the method of private sale shall
be in the same manner as that prescribed for the sale of property by
guardians under sections 49-203 and 49-204. . .. ,,37
These guardianship
sections add little, if anything, to what is already said, and section 49-204
serves only to create further confusion by authorizing the probate judge
to grant an order for the sale of assets subject to the discretionary requirement "that any sale of land of the ward be at public outcry as in the
case of administrator's sales.
...
a
In effect, then, a personal representative with several kinds of personalty to sell is faced with one procedure for the sale of perishable property,
another for uncollectible debts, another for the private sale of personalty,
another for stock, another for listed stocks and bonds, another for livestock, and no procedure for the public sale of anything other than a perishable good or an uncollectible debt. To be sure, the differences in the
procedure present no monumental obstacle. Yet the technicalities are tedious and expensive, and there is currently no valid policy reason for the
existence of such differences.
34. The text of the statute is contained in note 32, supra.
35. 1974 Ga. Laws 1135 (codified as GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1702(b) (1975)). GA. CODE
ANN. § 113-1702(b) (1975) expressly authorizes the private sale of personalty (and realty) in
order to pay debts as well as for distribution. The section also requires the usual court order
pursuant to a petition and a hearing.
36. Notice of the private sale must be served on all heirs of an estate, and various requirements are set forth for notifying adult heirs, minor heirs, and incompetent heirs, both
those who reside within Georgia and those who reside outside the state. GA. CODE ANN. §
113-1702(c) (1975). It may be presumed that these notice requirements apply only to private
sales of realty and personalty under section 113-1702(b), because the "petition" mentioned
in section 113-1702(c) apparently refers to the petition for a private sale under section 1131702(b). Moreover, the other sections concerning the public sale of personality have their
own respective notice requirements.
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1702(a) (1975) sets forth a specific procedure for the sale itself.
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1702(b) (1975).
38. GA. CODE ANN. § 49-204(d) (1979).
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Terms of Sale. Section 113-1703 s s gives the personal representative
the discretion to set the terms of the sale but holds him responsible for
the sufficiency of any security given at the time of the sale. Although the
section does not specify whether it applies to realty or personalty, it has
been construed by the courts in situations involving both.4 0 This statute
is to be commended for the flexibility it allows the personal representative. However, such latitude could more efficiently be realized in a general
statute encompassing the fiduciary duties and powers of the personal
representative.
Another statute requires that the personal representative state the
terms of the sale in all advertisements. 4 The statute does not indicate
whether it applies to realty or to personalty, and the cases construing the
section are too few to draw a conclusion about its applicability to both.
There is, however, no reason to doubt its dual role. This statute has been
cited by the Georgia courts but twice since its enactment in 1866.4" It is
superfluous and there is no reason for its continued existence.
IV.

A.

SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

In General

Because realty is divisible into fewer categories than personalty, the
Code provisions concerning the sale of realty by a personal representative
do not suffer from the problem of multiple rules of substance and procedure as much as those concerning the sale of personalty.
A private sale of land, accompanied by an agreement to perfect that
sale by compliance with legal formalities, is declared to be against public
policy.43 Although the Code does not flatly prohibit private sales, section
113-1717 permits them without court order only when a private sale has
been specifically authorized by will." Private sale of real estate may be
made in order to pay debts of the estate or to make distribution, but the
usual court order pursuant to a hearing must be obtained and the specific

39. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1703 (1975).
40. See, e.g., Crosby v. Lovett, 143 Ga. 483, 85 S.E. 317 (1915) (sale of mules); Goodwynne v. Bellerby, 116 Ga. 901, 43 S.E. 275 (1902) (sale of land).
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1718 (1975).
42. Adamson v. Petty, 230 Ga. 87, 195 S.E.2d 436 (1973); Daniel v. Jackson, 53 Ga. 87
(1874).
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1716 (1975); 26 S.E.2d 187 (1943); Marlowe v. Moss, 212 Ga.
781, 95 S.E.2d 796 (1956); Livingston v. Peacock, 155 Ga. 261, 116 S.E. 618 (1923); Campbell
Coal Co. v. Baker, 142 Ga. 434, 83 S.E. 105 (1914); Fisher v. Pair, 69 Ga. App. 492, 26 S.E.2d
187 (1943).
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1717 (1975).
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notice requirements in connection with the petition must be satisfied."'
The notice requirements as well as the directions for the time, place,
and manner of public sales of land are set forth."' Section 113-1702(a),
enacted in 1974, adds other requirements for "all public sales" which presumably includes public sales of real estate.'
When land ordered to be sold lies in two counties, the sale may be held
in either county.4 As is true with respect to personal property, the personal representative may exercise his discretion concerning the terms of
the sale,'49 but in any event the terms must be stated in any advertisement.50 Recital in the administrator's deed of compliance with all legal
requirements is prima facie evidence of compliance.5 1
The Code provides for two statutory consequences of the lawful sale of
land by an administrator: (1) the sale divests any liens on the land and
transfers them to the proceeds of the sale;5" and (2) any warranty given
by the administrator in any conveyance or contract executed by him is of
no effect, unless he intends to be bound personally." These provisions are
designed to protect purchasers from liens and the estate from later claims
45.

GA. CODE ANN.

§

text.
46.

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 113-1707 (1975) states:

113-1702(b) (1975). See notes 35 and 36 supra and accompanying

Every such sale shall be advertised in any newspaper having a general circulation in the county where the property to be sold is located, once a week for four
weeks after the leave is granted and before the sale. It shall be had at public
auction on the first Tuesday of the month between the usual hours of sale, and at
the place of public sales in the county having jurisdiction of the administration,
unless by special order, in the discretion of the judge of the probate court, land
lying in another county is sold in that county.
47. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1702(a) (1975).
48. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1712 (1975).

49. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1703 (1975). See notes 39 and 40 supra, and accompanying text
discussing the application of section 113-1703 to personalty.
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1718 (1975). See text accompanying notes 41 and 42 for criticism of this requirement.
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1711 (1975). The deed must be accompanied by a valid order
authorizing the administrator to sell. The order of sale must specify the land to be sold as
definitely as possible, Edwards v. Sands, 150 Ga. 11, 102 S.E. 426 (1920), or else grant general authority for the sale of all estate realty. Davie v. McDaniel, 47 Ga. 195 (1872). Numerous cases have held that the mere recitation in the deed that the sale was under court order
is not sufficient. See 2 REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 311 (4th ed.
1979).
52. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1709 (1975). The liens of judgments, mortgages, and taxes are
divested and transferred to the funds realized at the sale. Reed v. Aubrey, 91 Ga. 435, 17
S.E. 1022 (1893) (judgment); Herrington v. Tolbert, 110 Ga. 528, 35 S.E. 687 (1900) (tax
lien). Since a deed to secure debt is not a "lien" but a conveyance of title, the administrator's sale would not affect it, and the purchaser would acquire only the right to redeem upon
payment of the debt secured thereby. Daniel v. Wilson, 91 Ga. 238, 18 S.E. 134 (1892).
53. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1713 (1975).
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based on breach of warranty. While both purposes are legitimate, it would
seem that their embodiment in the statute is unnecessary, and that protection could be afforded by judicial pronouncement.
Section 113-1715 authorizes the assertion of a claim by a third party
against the real estate which an administrator proposes to sell and
prescribes the venue for trial of that claim."
The administrator must make a return to the probate court with respect to every sale. The return is to specify the property sold, the purchasers, the sale price and the terms of sale.55 There have been no cases
under this particular statute, and it is not clear that this duty is enforceable." The obvious purpose is to furnish protection not only to the heirs
and devisees but also to the personal representative, should an objection
later arise.
This statute provides little, if any, protection to those interested in the
estate. The failure to file a return does not create any additional rights in
the heirs or creditors. Furthermore, the only way the return will inform
those interested in the estate is if they go to the probate court and inspect the record. If there is any value in requiring these returns, it is that
the administrator will make a written record of the transaction soon after
it occurs. Even that justification, however, is diminished by the fact that
the administrator is required to make an annual report which will include
a record of all transactions.5 7 Moreover, in sales involving real property,
the information contained in the return will merely duplicate that contained in the deed. Any significant sale of personal property will be evidenced by a contract, receipt, or some other writing, and the return is
therefore a redundant formality.

54. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1715 (1975). See text accompanying notes 88-102 infra for discussion and criticism of the general statutory treatment of claims at sales.
55. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1719 (1975).
56. 2 REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 313 (4th ed. 1979) states that
section 113-1719 is merely directory and that the sale is valid even if no return is made.
57. As a general rule the personal representative must file his return each year within
sixty days following the anniversary date of his qualification. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1415
(1975). If the anniversay date is less than six months after he has filed his return, he does
not have to file again until the second anniversary date. At that time he must report for the
entire period from the last filed return. If the anniversay date is greater than six months, he
must file another return within sixty days. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1416 (1975). This rule applies only to fiduciaries who are by law required to file annual returns.
Fiduciaries who are not required to make annual returns by the terms of the will may
elect to make intermediate final accountings under GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-1417 to 1425
(1975). When they do so, the report is required to cover the entire period since qualification
or the last intermediate final accounting, if any. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1418 (1975). The
decedent's will may dispense with the returns so long as this does not injure any creditors or
third parties who are not legatees under the will. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1414 (1975).
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Authority to Make Sale

Payment of Debts or for Distribution. Land may be sold by the
administrator for the payment of debts of the estate or to effect distribution. The procedure for petitioning for the necessary court order and for
giving notice of that order is specified by statute." The statute also proclaims the effect of such order on all devisees under the will of a testator,
and preserves the right of appeal by an heir as well as the rights of a bona
fide purchaser who bought prior to the order."
The authorized purposes for sale are quite narrow. 0 The personal representative should be given more latitude in administration by allowing a
sale for any valid reason. The necessity of broader power can easily be
discerned: Suppose a personal representative considers it wise for the estate to invest the value of a parcel of land in some other form of property,
say, corporate securities. Section 113-1706, as written, would preclude
such a sale because it is not technically "for the payment of the debts of
the estate or for the purpose of distribution.""1
Wild Lands. Section 113-1704 provides that the sale of "wild lands"
shall not be treated any differently from the sale of any other land." This
legislation was enacted in 1958 to supersede the former law that allowed
wild, uncultivated lands, situated in a county other than that of the administration, to be sold at a special private sale."3 However, since the earlier statute has been abolished, there is no reason for the retention of the
new legislation that states the manifest conclusion that wild lands are to
be treated in the same fashion as others.
Rights of Way or Easements. The probate code contains special
provisions for the sale of a right of way or an easement by an administrator to the federal or state government or to any other party with the right
of eminent domain." The only substantial difference between these and
other conveyances is that these sales may be made privately. Thus these
sections comprise an exception to the general rule that all sales must be
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1706 (1975).
59. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1706 (1975).
60. The probate court has no authority to order the administrator to sell land to pay
debts or to make distribution upon the application of an heir. Only the administrator may
petition for authority to sell land under section 113-1706. Ireland v. Matthews, 129 Ga. App.
592, 200 S.E.2d 318 (1973). The heirs may object to the application on the ground that the
sale is not necessary for the payment of creditors or for distribution. Finch v. DuBignon, 117
Ga. 113, 43 S.E. 423 (1902); Thomas v. Couch, 171 Ga. 602, 156 S.E. 206 (1930). The courts
favor a division in kind whenever this can be fairly done. Copelan v. Kimbrough, 149 Ga.
683, 102 S.E. 162 (1920); McCook v. Pond, 72 Ga. 150 (1883).
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1706 (1975).
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1704 (1975).
63. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1704 (1975).
64. GA. CODE ANN. 88 113-1725 to 1731 (1975).

58.
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made publicly unless the probate court orders a private sale. It is still
necessary, however, that the probate court give prior approval. 65 There is
no valid reason for limiting private sales to transactions of this nature.
The personal representative should be able to convey any interest in
property at private sale and without prior judicial approval.
Land Held in Trust. Most trust instruments give the trustee broad
powers of sale, but if the trust instrument contains no such provision, a
statutory procedure is provided for the sale of real estate held in trust
when this is in the best interest of the beneficiaries. 6 The statute requires advertisement followed by court order authorizing the sale. The
requirement that "one hour's public notice of the commencement of the
same shall be given at the courthouse door on sale day"6 adds further
inefficiency to the procedure of selling a decedent's land.
Contingent Interest or Estate. If the deceased leaves a will which
stipulates that certain real property is to be held until the beneficiary
reaches the age of majority or until the happening of some future contingency, the executor may nevertheless sell the property to pay the debts of
the estate if there is an insufficient amount of personal property to discharge the debts." Before any such sale can be consummated, it must be
confirmed by the superior court. 9 Also such sales must follow the procedures prescribed for sales by guardians,7 0 i.e., an order from the probate
court is required before a guardian can proceed with the sale of his ward's
71
property.
This legislation applies solely to the situation where land is devised
under a testamentary direction that it be held intact until the devisee
reaches majority or until some other future event occurs. Another requirement is that the estate not have sufficient personalty to discharge
the indebtedness. At the time of the enactment of this legislation, no
trust could exist under Georgia law unless the beneficiary was a minor or
72
was a person of intemperate, wasteful, or profligate habits.

65. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1726 (1975) sets forth the procedure for making application to
sell, provides for notice and hearing, and the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent unknown parties or those under a disability. The order of sale must recite that
proper service has been made and that the vendee is a proper one. GA. CODE ANN. § 1131728 (1975).
66. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1708 (1975).
67. Id.
68. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1721 (1975).
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1722 (1975).
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1723 (1975).
71. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-203 to 204 (1979).
72. Under GA. CODE ANN. § 108-114 (1979) no trust could be created unless the beneficiary was under a disability, i.e., minority, mental weakness, or intemperate or wasteful habits. GA. CODE ANN. § 108-111.1 (1979) enacted in 1950 impliedly repealed that portion of
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Although section 113-1706 provides comprehensively for the sale of
land, it has been held that the special legislation of sections 113-1721 to
113-1723 provides the exclusive method for the sale of land directed to be
kept together by will. 78 In addition, there is inconsistency and confusion
as to whether the probate court or the superior court has jurisdiction to
approve the sale.
The general trust statute, section 108-408, requires the trustee, absent
an express power of sale in the trust instrument, to obtain an order of the
superior court before he can sell the corpus of the trust estate.7 4 Section
113-1722 also requires that a petition for sale be filed in the superior
court. Yet under section 113-1723 an order from the probate court is required since this is the method by which a guardian's sale of his ward's
property would be authorized under section 49-203. The reason for the
confusion concerning jurisdiction is that in 1920 when sections 113-1721
to 113-1723 were enacted, the superior court had jurisdiction over sales
by guardians. In 1958, section 49-203 was amended to give the probate
court jurisdiction over sales made by guardians, but no corresponding
amendment was made in section 113-1722.
Even if the inconsistency over jurisdiction were cleared up, it is difficult
to see the need for special legislation in the probate code dealing with the
sale of trust realty for the payment of debts and administration expenses.
Although gifts of realty and personalty of the same classification are now
7' 5
subject to sale for the payment of debts and claims against the estate,
section 113-1721 requires the sale of personalty before realty in order to
pay claims and expenses. This distinction, which is based on the classification of wealth, is anachronistic and indefensible. As seen earlier, section
113-1706 gives the personal representative the power, exercisable under
order of court, to sell land of the decedent in order to raise the necessary
funds for the satisfaction of creditors' claims.

section 108-114 declaring that only a person under a legal incapacity could be the beneficiary of a trust. The new legislation provided that the test for a valid trust was whether the
trustee had active duties to perform, rather than the disability of the beneficiary. See Moore
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ga. 798, 130 S.E.2d 718 (1963):
73. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 189 Ga. 344, 6 S.E.2d 716 (1939), held
that where section 113-1721 applied, a sale by virtue of an order of the court of probate
granted under section 113-1706 did not divest the title of the devisees.
74. GA. CODE ANN. § 108-408 (1979). The trustee has no authority to sell trust property
except under order of the superior court unless expressly authorized to do so by the trust
instrument. Springer v. Cox, 221 Ga. 673, 146 S.E.2d 753 (1966); Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga.
639, 68 S.E.2d 699 (1952); Burwell v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 119 Ga. 633, 46 S.E. 885
(1903).
75. "For the payment of debts realty and personalty shall be alike liable." GA. CODE
ANN. § 113-821 (1975). Under the older view, legacies and bequests were resorted to before
devises were taken. 6 PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLs § 53.16 (W. Bowe & D. Parker rev. ed. 1962).
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The title of devises and legacies does not vest in the devisee or legatee
until the executor gives his assent.7 6 Before assent is given, the title is in
the executor for the purpose of paying the debts of the estate. Unless the
will provides for a method by which the debts are to be paid, the residuum is to be used first, the general legacies and devises next and the
specific legacies last.7

If no provision is placed in the will regarding the procedures of sale, the
executor is to follow the procedures outlined in the statutes which apply
to administrators. If property is left in trust through a will, it will be
dealt with in the same manner as any other devise or legacy. Therefore no
special provision needs to be made in chapter 113-17 for these types of
dispositions.
Proscribed Sales. Two types of realty sales are expressly prohibited
by the Code. Property held adversely to the estate by a third person may
not be sold until the personal representative first regains possession.7 8 An
attempted sale of land which is in the adverse possession of a third party
is void and no title is conveyed to the purchaser. 79 Obviously, the sale of
such property would not bring its full value, and possession could not be
given to the vendee.
What has been said concerning the applicability of this prohibition to
the sale of personal property" is equally apposite to the sale of real property. The ultimate purpose of the statute-protecting the estate-is a legitimate end; but could not this objective be more efficiently attained by
vesting the personal representative with a general fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of the estate?
Other legislation precludes the sale, during the lifetime of a widow, of
any reversionary interest in land set apart as dower, 8' unless the sale is
necessary to pay debts. Conveyances of rights of way and easements are
excepted from the latter prohibition. The prohibition of such sales has
the legitimate goal of protecting widows whose rights vested prior to the
abolition of dower in Georgia. Because the Act abolishing dower 2 applies
76.
77.

GA. CODE ANN. § 113-801 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN.'§ 113-821 (1975). A detailed treatment of abatement is contained in

V. CHAFFIN, STUDIES IN THE GEORGIA LAW OF DECEDENTS'

ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS

263-73 (1978).

78. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1714 (1975).
79. See, e.g., Porter v. LaGrange Banking & Trust Co., 187 Ga. 528, 1 S.E. 2d 441 (1939);
Edwards v. Sands, 150 Ga. 11, 102 S.E. 426 (1920); Davitte v. Southern Ry. Co., 108 Ga. 665,
34 S.E. 327 (1899). The burden is on the personal representative to show that the property
he is attempting to sell is not held adversely. Hall v. Armor, 68 Ga. 449 (1882); Griffin v.
Cromartie, 41 Ga. App. 667, 154 S.E. 375 (1930).
80. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
81. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1710 (1975).
82. 1969 Ga. Laws 123.
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only prospectively, section 113-1710 may still affect those dower rights
which vested prior to the 1969 legislation. However, protection of widows
under this rare circumstance can be more efficiently effected by the personal representative's fiduciary duty to act with due care.
C.

Notice, Order and Terms of Sale

To ascertain the proper course for petitioning the court for leave to sell
and to determine the proper procedure for the public sale itself, the personal representative must consult several sections of chapter 113-17. Section 113-1706 requires notice of the petition to be published in the county
organ. Section 113-1707 sets the requirements of the public sale itself.
Additionally, the personal representative must not overlook section 1131702(a), for it adds even more technical requirements for the public sale
of a decedent's real estate.
The provisions requiring notice, hearing, court order, advertisement
and substantial compliance with statutory procedures are intended to
protect heirs, devisees, and creditors against the possibility that the administrator might sell property without their knowledge and to their detriment. These provisions guarantee them an opportunity to present their
interests before the probate court.
When the decedent dies testate but his will makes no provisions for the
sale of property, the executor must follow the same procedure as an administrator.8" However, in a well-drafted will the executor will be given
the authority to sell without following these statutory procedures. Why
do the heirs of an intestate and the devisees under a poorly drafted will
need this protection when it is not needed by the devisees under a welldrafted will?
What has been said concerning the applicability of sections 113-1703
and 1718 to the sale of personal property" holds equally true for their
applicability to the sale of realty. Their respective ends, while legitimate,
could be more efficiently realized by one statute incorporating general
fiduciary powers and duties. Similarly, section 113-1712, authorizing the
probate judge to order the sale of land lying in more than one county to
be held in either county, perhaps does no harm; but does the existence of
this discretionary power require that a code section be devoted to it?
D. Public or Private Sale
The confusion concerning the validity of private sales of realty is even
more pronounced than that concerning private sales of personalty. The
83.
84.

GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1101 (1975).
See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
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inconsistent provisions of section 113-1716 (private sale of land by an administrator against public policy), section 113-1717 (allowing private sales
without leave of court only if will authorizes same), and section 1131702(b) (authorizing private sales to pay debts or for distribution) leave
the personal representative in something of a quandary. Although section
113-1702(b) specifically authorizes the private sale of land, it would appear that section 113-1716 specifically prohibits the private sale of land
since such a sale would invariably be accompanied by "an obligation or
agreement to perfect the same by a compliance with legal formalities." 6
Furthermore, the objections to the additional procedural technicalities of
the private sale of personalty apply likewise to the private sale of realty.
A fundamental question should be posited at this point: Is it really necessary to distinguish between public and private sales of either realty or
personalty? The private sale was once thought to fetch a lower price than
a public sale. Moreover, the private sale was thought to provide a potential opportunity for a conniving personal representative and third party
to reap an iniquitous windfall.
It is impossible to make a rule specifying the best method of sale under
all circumstances; the administrator is best able to act in the interest of
the estate by exercising his own judgment. Moreover, a private sale is
often the most efficient and least costly method of liquidating real or personal property of the decedent. Any lingering opportunity for bad faith
on the part of a personal representative can be handled by charging him
with a statutory fiduciary duty.
E. Realty vs. Personalty
Another fundamental question should be posed at this time: Is it really
necessary to distinguish between sales of realty and personalty? Is there
really a greater need to protect the interests of the heirs in the real property of the estate by placing increased restrictions on the administrator's
latitude in dealing with realty?8a
The distinction perhaps made sense in an earlier day when a man's
wealth was, more often than not, measured by his land holdings, and
when land was the basis of virtually the entire economic system. However, to require court supervision today of the sale of a 200-square-foot
lot but not of 50,000 shares of IBM is hard to justify; therein lies the flaw
of distinguishing between the sale of real and personal property in the
85. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1716 (1975) outlaws as contrary to public policy private sales of
land under the quoted provision of the statute appearing in the text.
86. See Basye, Determination of Heirship, 54 MICH. L. REV. 73 (1956); Goldsworthy,
Uniform Probate Code - Abolishing the Distinction between Real and PersonalProperty in
Administration, 46 N.D. L. REV. 311 (1970).
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modern world. Such holdovers from yesteryear tend to invite cynicism
concerning the law and the legal profession.
F.

Claims at Sales

After an executor or administrator has advertised his intent to sell real
or personal property of the estate, any person who claims an interest in
the property may file an affidavit, claiming that property, in the probate
court of the county of administration." The judge of the probate court
has the duty to transmit the claim affidavit to the superior court,88 where
a determination of the validity of the claim will be made.8 9
Upon receiving notice of the affidavit, the administrator or executor is
directed to postpone the sale.9' Although the statute states that "[w]hen
a claim has been interposed . ..the sale . . . shall be postponed until
after the termination of the claim . .."' this language has been held to
be advisory only." If an administrator sells property after a claim is interposed, the purchaser is allowed to remain in possession until the outcome of the claim is determined. If the superior court holds in favor of
the claimant, the sale is null and void. Otherwise, the title vests in the
purchaser. "
The statutes assume that the claimant receives notice of the administrator's intent to sell by the required advertisement. 4 The claim affidavit
87. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-1801 to 1803 (1975). No bond or security is necessary to the
validity of the claim, Falls v. Griffith, 25 Ga. 72 (1858), but the jury may assess damages
against the claimant if it appears that the claim was interposed for delay only. Crawford v.
Crawford, 139 Ga. 68, 76 S.E. 564 (1912).
88. This transfer is required because the probate court has no authority to determine
conflicting claims of ownership. Salter v. Wetmore, 90 Ga. App. 672, 83 S.E.2d 852 (1954).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1901 (1971) specifies the jurisdiction of the probate court.
89. Claims to realty are transmitted to the superior court of the county where the land
lies. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-1715, 113-1802 (1975). Claims to personalty are transmitted to
the superior court of the county where the executor or administrator resides. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 113-1803 (1975). The claim is tried in the superior court in the same manner as provided
for the trial of claims to property levied on by execution. See generally GA. CODE ANN. §§
39-901 to 909 (1975).
90. "When a claim has been interposed as provided in the preceding sections, the sale of
the property advertised and claimed shall be postponed until after the termination of the
claim case." GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1804 (1975).
91. Id.
92. Luttgen v. Andrews, 174 Ga. 778, 163 S.E. 892 (1932) (where the administrator proceeds with the sale despite the claim, his deed is voidable and not void, and the purchaser in
possession thereunder may sue to enjoin the claimant from alleged acts of continuing
trespass).
93. Id.
94. There must be advertisement of the petition to sell real property in a decedent's
estate. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1706 (1975). This also applies to a petition to sell personal
property. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-1724, -1702 (1975), 49-204 (1979). There must also be ad-
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may be filed immediately after application for leave to sell is made, or it
may be filed at any time after the order of sale is granted and before the
sale occurs.'" The right to file a claim exists only if the personal representative is required to obtain a court order before selling the estate property. There is no right to file a claim under these sections if a will gives
the executor the authority to make sales.""
Even when the right to file exists,'7 it is of limited value. A purchaser at
an administrator's sale does not receive a title superior to that of the decedent."8 Whether a claim is filed does not affect either the title of the
purchaser or the claim of title by the person asserting the claim.
Chapter 113-18 is not the only method by which conflicting claims may
be settled. When there is an actual controversy, conflicting claims to the
title of property may be made under section 110-1101. 9 In addition, one
claiming title to property advertised for sale by a personal representative
may settle the issue by a suit in ejectment'0 0 in the case of realty or trover 01 if the subject matter is personalty. The claims procedure under
vertisement of the sale itself. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1707 (1975).
95. Harwell v. Foster, 102 Ga. 38, 28 S.E. 967 (1897) (claim affidavit may not be filed
prior to personal representative's application for leave to sell).
96. The right to file a claim applies only to sales which are judicial in their nature, e.g.,
sales under order of the court of probate. 2 REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 314 (4th ed. 1979). A sale by an executor under a power in a will is not judicial, and
therefore no claim can be interposed to such a sale. Harwell v. Foster, 102 Ga. 38, 28 S.E.
967 (1897); Davis v. Davis, 28 Ga. App. 306, 110 S.E. 919 (1922). The appropriate remedy in
such a case would be an application to equity to enjoin the sale, or a suit in ejectment in the
case of realty, or trover in the case of personalty. 2 REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN

§ 314 (4th ed. 1979).
97. It is unclear whether one who claims to be an heir or devisee, but has not been
declared as such, may utilize Chapter 113-18 to seek to prevent a sale until the issue of his
status has been settled. However, in Brewton v. McLeod, 216 Ga. 686, 119 S.E.2d 105
(1961), an action brought by one claiming to be a devisee under Chapter 113-18 was treated
GEORGIA

as if the claimant were proceeding under the declaratory judgment statutes. Those statutes
specifically confer on a potential heir, devisee or creditor the right to request a determination of whether he is an heir, devisee or creditor. GA. CODE ANN. § 110-1107 (1973). Furthermore, one may request that the administrator or executor be restrained from doing any act
in his fiduciary capacity pending construction of the will. GA. CODE ANN. § 110-1107 (1973).
98. Myers v. Warrenfells, 153 Ga. 648, 113 S.E. 180 (1922) (purchase money notes).
99. GA. CODE ANN. § 110-1101 (1973); State Highway Dept. v. Williams Lumber Co., 222
Ga. 23, 148 S.E.2d 426 (1966). Although this case concerns real property, it seems clear the
statute applies to both realty and personalty.
100. Details of the action of ejectment are contained in GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-101 to 121
(1980). The judgment is conclusive as to title between the parties, and upon verdict and
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, a writ of possession is issued by the clerk. GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-119, -120 (1980).
101. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 107-101 to 107 (1968). Plaintiff may elect to accept an alternative
verdict for the property or its value, verdict for damages alone, or for the property alone and
its hire, if any. GA. CODE ANN. § 107-105 (1968). The highest value proved between the time
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chapter 113-18 is merely cumulative and gives the plaintiff an election to
proceed with the court of probate as the statute prescribes or to sue in
ejectment or trover. 0 2
In addition to the general problems of chapter 113-18, relating to its
limited applicability and usefulness, the individual code sections suffer
from internal deficiencies. Sections 113-1801, -1802, -1803, and -1715 contain overlapping, repetitive and redundant provisions. Section 113-1801
declares that a person claiming realty about to be sold by the personal
representative may file a claims affidavit in the probate court. Section
113-1802 directs that a claim against realty be resolved in the county
where the land is located. Section 113-1803 states that the claim concerning personalty is to be tried in the county where the personal representative resides. As if the venue needed further clarification, section 113-1715
again directs that claims against a decedent's real property are to be tried
in the county where the land lies and claims against personalty are to be
tried in the county where the personal representative resides. There is no
justification for having four code sections to convey the simple idea that a
person claiming property of a decedent about to be sold by court order
may file a claims affidavit, and that the venue for a case concerning realty
is where the land lies and in the case of personalty where the representative resides.
The conclusion is that chapter 113-18 confers no substantial right or
protection on a claimant of estate property about to be sold by a personal
representative that is not accorded by other remedial devices, e.g., ejectment, trover, injunctive relief and declaratory judgment action. The entire chapter is unnecessary and should be repealed.
G.

Suggestions for Reform

Georgia's legislative provisions concerning sales by the personal representative suffer from several basic shortcomings. The code sections are
needlessly lengthy, technical, and confusing. There is little organization

of conversion and the trial may be recovered. GA. CODE ANN. § 107-103 (1968).
102. 2 REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 314 (4th ed. 1979). Although
the remedies of ejectment and trover are available in lieu of the Chapter 113-18 claim, the
latter precludes an application in equity to enjoin the sale by affording a complete and
adequate remedy at law. Matson v. Crowe, 193 Ga. 578, 19 S.E.2d 288 (1942).
This chapter vests jurisdiction over these claims in the superior court rather than the
probate court because the latter has no authority to determine conflicting claims of property, Hartsfield v. Hartsfield, 87 Ga. App. 707, 75 S.E.2d 276 (1953), nor does it have the
authority to construe a will, Dennis v. McCray, 237 Ga. 605, 229 S.E.2d 367 (1976). The
probate court does, however, have the power to ascertain the identity of the heirs at law. GA.
CODE ANN. § 113-2801 (1975). To require these claims to be sent to the superior court is
simply an advantageous timesaving device.
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or internal coherence;0 s there is inconsistent overlap among some
parts;104 and many of the sections that have accumulated over the years
are simply superfluous. A more serious defect is that the personal representative must utilize the cumbersome and expensive process of obtaining
a court order to perform virtually any act that is not specifically authorized by a testator. This process is necessary even when there is no disagreement among the decedent's heirs or devisees. Every sale is considered
an adversary proceeding to which the heirs and devisees must be made
10 5
parties.
The emphasis placed by Georgia law on protection of the assets of the
estate and the provision for close judicial supervision of sales by the personal representative is excessive. The elaborate safeguards against abuses
must be complied with even when there is no objection to the sale. The
process is cumbersome, complicated, and expensive; it calls for numerous
trips to the courthouse by the personal representative's attorney. These
precautions and formalities are not justified in the vast majority of situations. It is clear that there exists a need for revision of the substantive
and procedural requirements of the current law.
There is no reason for the separate treatment of sales of specific subject
matter, such as wild lands, corporate stock, livestock, etc. All such legislation should be eliminated. One comprehensive section dealing with the
conveyancing of a decedent's assets by his personal representative would
be sufficient. There is no need to limit the availability of an order to sell
to instances where a sale is necessary to pay debts or to distribute the
estate. A sale should be authorized for any legitimate purpose. There is
also no need to continue any distinction between public and private sales,
or distinctions between the sale of realty and personalty.
The authority of the administrator to sell estate property should not be
conditioned upon notice, hearing, a valid court order and substantial
compliance with statutory procedure. The law currently provides that an
administrator must make an inventory of the estate,' and that it shall

103. For example, "Sale of Wild Lands" (§ 113-1704) appears between "Terms of Sale;
Credit; Security" (§ 113-1703) and "Sale of Insolvent or Doubtful Notes, Judgments, etc." (§
113-1705).
104. For example, the statutes concerning private sales: §§ 113-1702(b); -1716; -1717.
105. This philosophy is criticized in Fletcher, Washington's Non-Intervention Executor
- Starting Point for Probate Simplification,41 WASH. L. REV. 33 (1966). Professor Fletcher calls for a reversal in attitude:
[Riather than make all persons and all probates go through the elaborate machinery in order to be sure that all persons are protected, allow the mass of them to be
wound up in a simple manner, providing, to be sure, machinery adequate to detect
or prevent wrongdoing and adequate avenues by which the adjudicatory process
and strong arm of the court can be invoked. Id. at 75.
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1402 (1975).
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be appraised upon a request by an heir or creditor. 10 7 This supplies sufficient notice. If any interested party has a legitimate reason why some
property should not be sold, provision should be made for him to petition
the probate court to prohibit any such sale. It should also be noted that
an administrator is currently required to carry a sufficient bond. 08 These
provisions along with the requirement that the administrator act as a
fiduciary should furnish sufficient protection for the heirs and creditors.
There is no reason why heirs and creditors should be able to void a sale
upon mere procedural irregularities in the execution of that sale. Unless
the administrator has acted in a self-dealing manner, purchasers should
be able to obtain a good, non-voidable title. There is also no need to provide for the filing of post-sale returns now mandated in section 113-1719.
Although the filing of these returns may not cause a substantial increase
in the costs of administration nor occupy a large amount of time in the
probate court, the costs still outweigh any benefits. Finally, since sections
113-1721 to 1723 are internally inconsistent as to which court has jurisdiction, and because other portions of Title 113 sufficiently deal with
property left in trust by a will, these sections should be* repealed.
Instead of attempting to patch up the many shortcomings in existing
law, it would be preferable to repeal chapters 113-17 and 113-18 in their
entirety and to adopt the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code relating to sales by the personal representative.
H.

The U.P.C. Approach

The Uniform Probate Code sheds the traditional court-supervised procedures by requiring the personal representative to proceed without court
order unless specifically directed to the contrary.1"' The only notice that
the personal representative is absolutely required to give is a general notice of his appointment within thirty days of same to all interested heirs
and devisees."10 The Uniform Probate Code provides the personal representative with a "power over title" '' of all property of the estate and
107.

108.

GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.

§ 113-1401.1 (1975).
§ 113-1217 (Supp. 1980).

109. U.P.C. § 3-704. See generally Haviland, Shall We Rebuild Our House of Probate?
The Uniform Probate Code, 10 U. KAN. L. REV. 575 (1971). There is persuasive evidence
that the Uniform Probate Code significantly reduces probate costs. Kinsey, A Contrast of
Trends in Administrative Costs in Decedents' Estates in a Uniform Probate Code State
(Idaho) and a Non-Uniform Probate Code State (North Dakota), 50 N.D. L. REV. 523
(1974); Drury, The Uniform Probate Code and Illinois Probate Practice, 6 Loy. CHi. L.J.
303 (1975); Crapo, The Uniform ProbateCode - Does It Really Work? 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
395.
110. U.P.C. § 3-705. Of course, notice to creditors is also required.
111. The concept of "power over title" is designed to ease the succession of decedents'
assets of which the personal representative does not have actual possession. If the power is
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authorizes the exercise of such power without notice, hearing, or leave of
court." 2 Moreover, the Code enumerates some twenty-seven specific
transactions authorized for a personal representative "acting reasonably
for the benefit of interested persons."'1' One such power is to "sell, mortgage, or lease any real or personal property of the estate or any interest
therein for cash, credit, or for part cash and part credit, and with or without security for the unpaid balances.""" There is no distinction between
the Code's treatment of realty and personalty.
The power given a personal representative is, of course, not without its
limitations. The personal representative is subject to being held personally liable to any interested party for damage caused by breach of his
fiduciary duty."1 Moreover, any transaction by the personal representative involving a conflict of interest is subject to scrutiny and may be held
voidable by an interested party." 6 Also, any interested party may require
1
the personal representative to furnish a bond.'
The Uniform Probate Code eliminates the unnecessary substantive
rules and procedural technicalities of chapter 113-17, as, for example, the
distinction between sales of personalty and realty and the distinction between public and private sales. More importantly, the passive role of the
court would reduce the necessary time and cost of the conveyancing process. The personal representative is treated as a fiduciary vested with
general powers, but the necessary safeguards of the old system for the
protection of any interested party (at his election) would be preserved.
If the Uniform Probate Code approach to sales is adopted, two minor
additions should be considered. First, the general power of the personal
representative could be more definitively described by a statute similar to
North Carolina's:
[A] personal representative has the power to perform in a reasonable and
prudent manner every act which a reasonable and prudent man would
perform incident to the collection, preservation, liquidation, or distribution of a decedent's estate so as to accomplish the desired result of settling and distributing the decedent's estate in a safe, orderly, accurate
unexercised by the personal representative before his discharge, the title of the heirs or
devisees is clear. See Goldsworthy, Uniform Probate Code - Abolishing the Distinction
Between Real and Personal Property in Administration, 46 N.D. L. REV. 311 (1970).

112. U.P.C. § 3-711.
113. U.P.C. § 3-715. Such powers are subject to order of abatement in U.P.C. § 3-902, as
follows: (1) property not disposed of by the will; (2) residuary devises; (3) general devises;
(4) specific devises. Such abatement is "without any preference or priority as between real
and personal property." U.P.C. § 3-902(a).
114. U.P.C. § 3-717(23).
115. U.P.C. § 3-712.
116. U.P.C. § 3-713.
117. U.P.C. § 3-605.
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and expeditious manner ... '"
A second additional provision, perhaps in the Judicial Sales section of the
Code, could specify a simple and unified procedure for public sales. This
statute would provide the personal representative with some direction
should he opt to convey any of a decedent's property at a public sale.
V.

THE INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT (BOND FOR TITLE)

When a person executes a bond for title to land or a contract for the
sale of land and dies without executing a deed in compliance therewith,
the holder of the instrument may apply to the probate court having jurisdiction over the administration of the decedent vendor's estate for an order requiring the personal representative to make title according to the
terms of the instrument.' This right becomes operative when the decedent made no provision for performance in his will and the holder has
complied with the conditions or obligations stipulated in the bond for
title.1 "
The Code sets forth a detailed procedural scheme to implement the
enforcement of the bond for title and the contract for the sale of land.
The petitioner must give ten days' written notice to the administrator or
executor, and, unless waived, notices must also be given to the heirs of
the decedent by publication in the official organ of the county once a
week for four weeks. The probate judge is to hear any objections and is to
decide whether the conditions of the bond or contract have been satisfied
and whether justice compels him to order the title to be made. Either
party may appeal the decision of the probate judge to the superior
court.'2 '
The heirs of the deceased vendee under a bond for title or contract for
sale have the right to petition the probate judge having jurisdiction over
the decedent's estate to order the seller to give title to the estate of the
deceased holder."' If both the vendee and vendor die before the bond or
the contract is fulfilled, notice is to be given to the legal representative of
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13-3 (Supp. 1979).
119. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1601 (1975). In 1958 the statute was rewritten to extend its
application to executory contracts for the sale of land as well as bonds for title, and to make
the estate of a testator as well as an intestate liable thereon. 1958 Ga. Laws 657 (codified as
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1601 (1975). The concept of a bond for title is set forth in note 4,
supra.
120. Ford v. Holmes, 61 Ga. 419 (1878).
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1602 (1975).
122. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1603 (1975). Thompson & King v. Atwater, 84 Ga. 270, 10 S.E.
718 (1889). Land conveyed to the deceased vendee's heirs is subject to the debts of the
vendee in the same manner as other lands of his estate. Mallard v. Curran, 123 Ga. 872, 51
S.E. 712 (1905); Strickland v. Dent, 25 Ga. 42 (1858).

338

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

the vendor who shall make title to the estate of the vendee. 2 The costs
of the procedure are to be paid by the representative of the estate of the
vendor, unless the time for the making of title and for payment of money
elapsed before the death of the obligor; in the latter event, the costs are
to be paid by the petitioner." '
Georgia is the only state which gives the bond for title independent
legal significance. In other states a bond for title is regarded legally as a
contract to convey land 28 and is indistinguishable in its ordinary operation and effect from a simple agreement for the same purpose.126 A Texas
court has stated that the bond for title is only a contract to convey; however, the court held that the bond for title may ripen into an equitable
2 7 Arkansas courts have declared
title upon payment of the consideration.1
that the bond for title is more than12 an executory contract but have assigned it no additional significance. 0
The detailed statutory scheme in chapter 113-16 is unique to Georgia.
For example, New York law simply provides that an action may be maintained by and against the executor in all cases in which an action might
have been maintained by or against his testator.' 2 In Virginia a transfer
by the representative of the decedent pursuant to decedent's contract will
be as effective as if made by the decedent, and the contract is to be filed
with the deed.180 Massachusetts simply provides that specific performance is the proper remedy to compel conveyance of title in satisfaction of
the decedent's contract and
gives concurrent jurisdiction to the probate
8
court and the trial court.' 3

A statutory scheme similar to Georgia's for the specific enforcement of
a contract for the sale of land pending at the death of the testator or
intestate was repealed by Florida in 1974. The statute was replaced by a
provision which confers on the personal representative of the deceased
the power to "[p]erform or compromise, or when [proper,] refuse performance of, the decedent's contracts.' 2 2 This statute in essence gives a
contract for the sale of land the same legal effect as all other enforceable
123. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1604 (1975).
124. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1605 (1975).
125. See, e.g., Sanders v. Danley, 289 Ala. 324, 267 So.2d 169 (1972); Kenton Coal & Oil
Co. v. Petroleum Explorers, 287 Ky. 563, 154 S.W.2d 556 (1941).
126. See, e.g., Wahl v. Hutto, 249 S.C. 500, 155 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
127. Faddell v. Taylor, - Tex. -, 239 S.W. 931 (1922).
128. White v. Page, 216 Ark. 632, 226 S.W.2d 973 (1950).
129. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.1 (McKinney 1967).
130. VA. CODE §§ 64.1-148 (1980).
131. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 204, § 1 (Michie/Law Co-op 1969).
132. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.612(2) (Supp. 1980) repealing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.32
(1973).
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contracts entered into by the decedent."'8 The Florida provision for powers of the personal representative is identical to that provided by the Uni13 4
form Probate Code.
As the security deed has come into frequent use, 8 5 the bond for title,
formerly extensively used, is now seldom used in Georgia." s" With one
exception,"s " the question of enforcement of a bond for title or sales contract for land has not been addressed by the Georgia courts for thirty
years.
Both in Georgia and in other states, a contract for the sale of land
made by a decedent is enforced on the same basis as all other contracts
entered into by the decedent. Other Georgia statutes provide that the executor or administrator must fulfill all enforceable contracts entered into
by the decedent. ss There is no valid reason why a contract to convey
land, the enforceability of which is governed by reference to general contract principles, requires independent treatment in Georgia's probate
code. The time is long past for the repeal of our bond for title legislation.

133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.612(2) also confers on the personal representative the power
to perform, compromise or refuse performance of the decedent's contracts in general.
134. U.P.C. § 3-715(3). For a more extended discussion of the fiduciary's powers, duties
and liabilities under the Uniform Probate Code, see L. AVERILL, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN
A NUTSHELL 336-343 (1978).
135. The security deed (also called deed to secure debt or loan deed) operates as a transfer of the legal title to the collateral to the creditor. The grantor generally remains in possession, but the creditor has right of entry in case of default. When the debt is paid, title
reverts to the grantor. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1301 (1967); S. MITCHELL, REAL PROPERTY IN
GEORGIA 587-89 (2d ed. 1960).
136. Kemp v. Parks, 227 Ga. 319, 180 S.E.2d 350 (1971). The court observed:
A bond for title (formerly used extensively but now seldom used) combines to
some extent the features of a warranty deed from the seller to the buyer, and a
security deed from the buyer to the seller. It binds the vendor to make warranty
title. The vendor in a bond for title is a trustee of the vendee for the conveyance
of the title and the vendee is trustee for the payment of the purchase money. It
has been called a muniment of title. A bond for title, with the purchase money
paid, is a complete title.
(citations omitted), Id. at 321, 180 S.E.2d at 352.
137. Mitchell v. Culpepper, 222 Ga. 587, 150 S.E.2d 925 (1966) (petition seeking to require the administrator to convey title under a sales contract denied).
138. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1525 (1975) provides as follows:
The administrator, as far as possible, shall fulfill the executory and comply with
the executed contracts of the decedent, and he shall have a corresponding right to
demand the same of the parties contracted with. If, however, the personal skill of
the intestate entered into the consideration of the contract, his death renders the
execution impossible, and the contract, though entire, shall be considered as divisible and closed at his death, and the part execution by the deceased shall authorize and require a corresponding compliance by the other contracting party.
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CONCLUSION

Georgia deserves an efficient system by which a personal representative
may convey real and personal assets of his decedent. A probate code
should not be cluttered with unnecessary technicalities of substance or
procedure which are better left to judicial utterance, if to anything at all.
The fact that a particular statute is harmless is no reason for retaining it;
nothing should remain on the books unless it can be affirmatively
justified.
Our existing legislation is a historical hodgepodge of provisions which
are often conflicting and inevitably confusing. The various substantive
rules and procedural pitfalls of the present Georgia Code which have accumulated haphazardly over the years need to be eliminated. The goal is
to develop a fair but efficient system for the sale and conveyance of estate
assets by the personal representative. The recommendations set forth in
this article would be a step in the direction of a modern probate code for
Georgia. Once this task is accomplished, we will wonder why we waited so
long.

